Why do people dislike low-wage trade competition with posted workers in the service sector?  by Calmfors, Lars et al.
W
w
L
H
a
b
c
d
a
A
R
R
A
K
S
P
W
A
J
F
D
1
t
o
c
p
E
r
i
t
s
T
w
b
1
hThe Journal of Socio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The  Journal  of  Socio-Economics
j our na l ho me  pa g e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /soceco
hy  do  people  dislike  low-wage  trade  competition  with  posted
orkers  in  the  service  sector?
ars  Calmforsa,∗,  Girts  Dimdinsb, Marie  Gustafsson  Sendénc,
enry  Montgomeryc, Ulrika  Stavlötd
Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Department of Psychology, University of Latvia, Jurmalas gatve 74/76, Riga, LV 1083, Latvia
Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, 106 92 Stockholm, Sweden
Fores, Bellmangatan 10, 118 20 Stockholm, Sweden
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 17 August 2012
eceived in revised form 1 September 2013
ccepted 2 September 2013
eywords:
ervices trade
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  issue  of low-wage  competition  in  services  trade involving  posted  workers  is  controversial  in the  EU.
Using  Swedish  survey  data,  people’s  attitudes  are found  to be more  negative  to such  trade  than  to  goods
trade.  The  differences  depend  on both  a preference  for favouring  social  groups  to  which  individuals
belong  (the  domestic  population)  and  altruistic  justice  concerns  for foreign  workers.  In small-group
experiments,  we  ﬁnd a tendency  for  people  to  adjust  their  evaluations  of  various  aspects  of trade  to  their
general  attitude.  This  tendency  is stronger  for those  opposed  to than  those  in favour  of low-wage  tradeosted workers
age regulations
ttitude formation
EL classiﬁcation:
160
competition.  This  may indicate  that  the  former  group  forms  its  attitudes  in  a  less  rational  way  than  the
latter  group.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.010
. Introduction
Services make up around 70 per cent of economic activity in
he EU. Still cross-border trade in services account for only a ﬁfth
f all cross-border trade. A number of EU policy documents have
oncluded that there are still a number of barriers for services trade
reventing the Single Market from ‘delivering its full potential’ (e.g.
uropean Commission, 2011, 2012a,b).
A speciﬁc feature of some types of services trade is that they
equire temporary mobility of labour that has to be posted in the
mporting country to provide the service in question. The issue of
o what extent low-wage trade competition with posted workers
hould be allowed has been hotly debated in the EU in recent years.
he discussion was initially triggered by the enlargement of the EU,
hich has enabled low-wage service providers in the new EU mem-
er states to compete in the markets of the old member states. The
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 8 16 30 76; fax: +46 8 16 29 46.
E-mail address: lars.calmfors@iies.su.se (L. Calmfors).
053-5357 ©  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND ldebate has concerned inter alia building workers in Sweden and the
UK, plumbers in France and butchers in Germany.1 At the EU level,
there was  a heated discussion before the new Service Directive was
ﬁnally adopted in 2006. In the elections to the European Parliament
in 2009, the aim of ﬁghting ‘wage dumping’ through a revision of the
Posted Workers Directive featured prominently in the campaigns
of socialist candidates in many countries. Trade unions have consis-
tently argued that temporarily posted workers should be bound by
wage regulations or collective wage agreements in host countries,
even though such restrictions can be viewed as barriers to trade in
services.
Over the last ten years, a research literature on trade in services
has emerged. It points to remarkable similarities between trade
in goods and trade in services (Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2010). The
normative conclusions on the aggregate welfare gains from trade
seem to apply to trade in services as well (Francois and Hoekman,
2009). Still, the debate referred to above suggests that attitudes in
general are much more hostile to trade in services involving the
use of posted workers not bound by wage regulations or collective
agreements in host countries than to traditional trade in goods. If
1 See, for example, Courier International (2005), Le Soir (2005), Knabe and Schöb
(2008) and BBC (2009).
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his is true, it could represent a serious constraint on the amount
f low-wage competition from foreign service providers that will
e accepted.
Our aim here is to examine more systematically whether, and if
o to what extent and why, the attitudes of the population to trade
n services using posted workers differ from the attitudes to other
ypes of trade. We  build on research insights from both economics
nd psychology.
We  focus on the following questions:
. Are the general attitudes indeed less favourable to trade in ser-
vices with posted workers than to other types of trade?
. Which attitude dimensions are most important for the differ-
ences in general attitudes between trade in services and other
types of trade? We distinguish between two fundamental sets of
human motives described in psychology. The ﬁrst set of motives
is related to in-group favouritism,  i.e. a tendency to be more con-
cerned with effects on social groups to which individuals belong
(in-groups, in this case the domestic population) than to other
groups (out-groups, in this case foreigners) (Hewstone et al.,
2002). The second set of motives is related to altruistic justice
concerns: observing situations that go against individuals’ under-
standing of a just world order prompts psychological discomfort
(Tyler et al., 1997; Lerner, 2003). An example of the ﬁrst type of
motives is fear of ‘social dumping’, i.e. of ‘unfair wage competi-
tion’. An example of the second type is a desire to prevent ‘unjust
exploitation’ of foreign workers.
. How rational is the formation of attitudes to trade in services? Is
the general attitude to such trade rationally formed from under-
lying attitude dimensions in a similar way as when economists
assume that individuals have well-deﬁned preference functions
with a number of arguments? Or do individuals adjust their var-
ious attitude dimensions to their general attitude in a process of
coherence seeking (which serves to justify the general attitude)
as has been shown by psychologists to be the case in other areas
(Holyoak and Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2008). Are there system-
atic differences in how attitudes are formed between people who
are more favourable to trade and those who are more negative?
These issues are examined with the help of two data sets
rom Sweden. First, we performed two broad telephone surveys
f representative samples of the population, where respondents
ere asked about both their general attitudes and various atti-
ude dimensions regarding different types of trade. Second, we
id experiments with small groups of participants to highlight the
rocess through which attitudes are formed.
The issues we study have not been examined before. Previous
esearch has focused on trade in general. In public opinion polls
rom several countries, it has been found that there is greater sup-
ort for free trade in principle than ‘in practice’ when more concrete
uestions on whether imports should be restricted are asked (see
almfors et al., 2009). A few studies have found that attitudes reﬂect
conomic self-interest, as deﬁned by the Heckscher–Ohlin trade
heory. For example, Mayda and Rodrik, using data from the 1995
nternational Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the 2000 World
alues Survey (WVS), found that skilled workers had a favourable
ttitude to trade in high-income countries (where they are likely
o gain from it), but a negative attitude in low-income countries
where they are likely to lose). The results in Scheve and Slaughter
1998) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2002) were similar. In contrast,
eaulieu et al. (2001) found that high-skilled workers in both high-
ncome and low-income countries are more positive to trade than
ow-skilled workers.
Using ISSP and WVS  data, Mayda (2005) found that higher skills
o hand in hand with more pro-immigration attitudes in countries
here natives have a high skill level relative to immigrants. Thisio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93 83
is consistent with economic self-interest since immigration then
reduces the relative supply of skilled to unskilled labour with the
consequence that the relative wage of skilled labour increases.
Mayda (2007) found that working in a non-traded goods sector
increased the likelihood of being pro-trade, while this did not affect
attitudes to immigration. Also this is in line with economic self-
interest, as employees in non-traded goods sectors gain from more
goods trade (which implies cheaper imports but does not threaten
jobs in that sector), whereas they tend to lose from immigration
(which implies more competition for jobs in that as well as in other
sectors).
2. General attitudes to trade
We ﬁrst examine whether it really is the case that general atti-
tudes are less favourable to trade in services with posted workers
than to trade in goods as suggested by the public debate.
2.1. Theoretical background
Standard trade theory views exports of goods as a way of indi-
rectly exporting labour services (Caves et al., 2006; Krugman et al.,
2011). Although the export of labour services is more direct in the
case of trade in services with posted workers, there is no reason to
expect the economic effects to be different in principle. There are
overall gains from trade for all involved countries because aggre-
gate income is raised when they specialise in production according
to their comparative advantages or exploit economies of scale.
There are, however, both winners and losers in each country.
According to the Heckscher–Ohlin model, trade takes place
between countries with different relative factor endowments.
Countries relatively abundant in (physical and human) capital
specialise in the production of capital-intensive goods. Countries
relatively abundant in labour instead specialise in labour-intensive
goods. A long-run consequence of the opening up of trade between
capital-abundant and labour-abundant countries is that the relative
factor return to labour falls in the former countries: the wage for
(unskilled) labour falls relative to the return to capital (physical and
human). The reverse development occurs in the labour-abundant
economies.
In the short run, immobile production factors (for example,
labour with speciﬁc skills) suffer real income losses in import-
competing sectors but obtain income gains in export sectors. For
mobile production factors (such as labour with general skills which
can be used in any sector) the direction of the real income changes
are ambiguous, although most likely minor. There may also be
substantial adjustment costs for labour that is re-allocated: dis-
placed workers often have to accept substantial wage cuts to be
re-employed elsewhere (Kletzer, 2004; OECD, 2005).
Although the economic effects are similar, psychological
research suggests several reasons why  attitudes are likely to be
less favourable to trade in services with posted workers than to
conventional trade in goods. It has been shown that visibility of
information and direct experience of an attitude object has strong
effects on people’s attitudes (Krosnick et al., 1993; Fabrigar et al.,
2005). When a plant is closed down because of import competi-
tion, the competitors may appear rather abstract. They are much
more visible with trade in services that requires presence of foreign
workers ‘on the spot’. A similar issue arises with respect to altru-
istic justice concerns. Lower wages for foreign than for domestic
workers might be perceived much more negatively when the for-
eign workers are posted in the domestic economy and hence are
more visible than when they perform their work abroad.
In addition, a large body of research shows that people are loss
aversive (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Loss aversion means that
8  of Socio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93
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Table 1
Composition of the samples, per cent.
Variables 2007 2010
Gender
Women  52.5 52.2
Men  47.5 47.8
Education
Compulsory school 12.7 8.3
Upper secondary school 37.4 38.5
Adult education/not completed university 11.8 10.5
University and college 37.2 41.2
PhD  0.9 1.4
Employment status
Entrepreneurs 9.3 8.3
Employed 60.4 60.6
Unemployed 3.2 2.7
Students 8.8 5.2
Retired 15.0 18.7
Sick-listed 2.5 3.4
Parental leave 0.5 1.1
Sector of employment
Agriculture/foresting/ﬁshing 3.2 2.9
Manufacturing 17.5 11.1
Construction 8.4 8.8
Transport 6.0 7.3
Hotel and restaurants 2.3 1.8
Retail/wholesale trade 5.7 4.6
Finance 5.9 3.7
Public sector 10.7 12.4
Health and medical care 13.8 12.5
Education 9.9 13.2
Other services 16.6 17.5
Table 2
General attitudes to different types of trade.
Goods trade Services trade Offshoring Average
Survey 1 2.89 2.34 (−0.55) 2.49 (−0.40) 2.57
Survey 2 2.66 2.09 (−0.57) 2.40 (−0.26) 2.39
Note: Means are calculated across individuals in the sample, excluding ‘don’t know’
and  missing values. Only data from individuals who answered all questions are
included in the calculations. In each survey, the averages for the different types of4 L. Calmfors et al. / The Journal
n people’s perception losses loom larger than equal gains. Loss
version could contribute to a status-quo bias that implies a more
egative attitude to trade in services than to trade in goods. The rea-
on is that the opening-up of trade in services, based on low-wage
ompetition, is perceived to cause losses for the employees exposed
o the increased competition that are more important than the cor-
esponding gains for consumers. In contrast, attitudes to existing
rade in goods may  to a larger extent be based on the losses that
onsumers would suffer if such trade was restricted (rather than on
he gains for employees being exposed to less foreign competition).
Yet another possible explanation of more negative attitudes to
ow-wage competition in services trade, requiring the posting of
oreign labour, than to such competition in goods trade is negative
ttitudes towards immigration in general (Verkuyten and Nekuee,
999; Steele et al., 2002).
It is not obvious how one should study the impact of these
sychological factors. Negative attitudes towards immigration are
ften implicit, i.e. they inﬂuence people’s judgments on subcon-
cious levels and may  therefore be difﬁcult to measure. Nor is
t obvious how one should evaluate the importance of visibil-
ty and loss-aversion effects. One – indirect – method is to also
xamine attitudes to offshoring of ﬁnal production. If visibility
ffects, loss-aversion concerns and anti-immigration sentiments
re unimportant, one should expect more negative attitudes to
ffshoring than to import competition in the service sector based
n the use of posted workers, as relocation of ﬁnal produc-
ion, which is often for export markets, can be expected to give
omestic consumers smaller beneﬁts in terms of lower import
rices.
.2. Survey questions – general attitudes
Data on the attitudes to different types of trade were collected in
wo surveys. The ﬁrst survey was carried out in January 2007, the
econd one in December 2010. In both surveys a random sample
f 1000 individuals in Sweden aged 18–75 years were interviewed
n telephone. If contact was unsuccessful after six follow-up tele-
hone calls, a new respondent was randomly selected until the
arget of 1000 responses was reached. The response rate was
round 50 per cent.2
The composition of the two samples is reported in Table 1.
To measure attitudes to low-wage competition, the respondents
n each survey were asked about their attitudes to ordinary trade in
oods, trade in services involving posted workers, and offshoring
f ﬁnal production. More speciﬁcally they had to give their answers
o the following questions along a ﬁve-point scale from ‘very bad’
o ‘very good’:
. Question on goods trade: Do you think it is good or bad that ﬁrms
that produce goods in the new EU countries, and that pay lower
wages than ﬁrms in Sweden, can compete freely in the Swedish
market?
. Question on services trade: Do you think it is good or bad that
ﬁrms from the new EU countries that produce services, for exam-
ple in construction, and that pay lower wages to workers posted
in Sweden than Swedish ﬁrms, can compete freely in the Swedish
market?
2 The data collection was  outsourced to a market research company. The described
rocedure of selecting new respondents is a common practice that has been shown
o  sufﬁciently reduce non-response bias, at the same time as it minimises mea-
urement error and item non-response (Olson, 2013; Sakshaug et al., 2010). Both
he  number of call attempts and the response rate reported here are within ranges
ypical to this kind of survey studies (Holbrook et al., 2008).trade differ signiﬁcantly from each other (p > 0.05). Entries within parenthesis show
the difference in score between the type of trade in the column and goods trade.
3. Question on offshoring: Do you think it is good or bad that
Swedish ﬁrms can move production freely to the new EU countries
where wages are lower than in Sweden?
Table 2 shows the means of the responses to the three questions
in the two surveys. The score 1 corresponds to ‘very bad’, 2 to ‘bad’,
3 to ‘neither good nor bad’, 4 to ‘good’ and 5 to ‘very good’.
Since the mid-point of the scale used is 3 and all the means are
below this value, the results indicate a negative attitude in general
towards low-wage trade competition. The average general view lies
between ‘neither good nor bad’ and ‘bad’.
Our hypothesis that attitudes are more adverse to trade in ser-
vices with posted workers than to trade in goods is conﬁrmed. The
result holds in both surveys. The attitude difference between the
two types of trade is almost the same (the entries in parenthe-
sis in the second column). The general attitude is more negative
to offshoring than to goods trade, but not so negative as it is to
services trade with posted workers. This is consistent with visibil-
ity effects, loss-aversion concerns or anti-immigration sentiments
being important, as discussed in Section 2.1.
All the trade attitudes are more negative in Survey 2 from
2010 than in Survey 1 from 2007. The differences are signiﬁcant
(at the one-percent level) for both goods and services. One could
speculate that the international economic crisis starting in the
autumn of 2008 has something to do with this, as the crisis has
vividly illustrated how macroeconomic shocks can be propagated
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hrough international trade. It is also possible that the severity of
he euro crisis could have led to more negative attitudes to Euro-
ean integration in general. However, these conjectures are not
ully supported by the responses to the questions regarding the
arious attitude dimensions (see Section 3.2). It is noteworthy that
espite the more negative attitudes to trade in general in Survey 2,
he attitude differences between the various types of trade remain
ery stable.
. Attitude dimensions
Next, we examine along which dimensions the attitudes to the
arious types of trade differ. We  take as our starting point the argu-
ents that have been put forward in the debate on regulating the
ages of posted workers. Two dimensions have dominated. The
rst dimension is to prevent ‘social dumping’, i.e. to protect the
obs of domestic workers from what is regarded as unfair low-wage
ompetition. The second dimension is to prevent ‘unjust exploita-
ion’ of foreign workers when they are paid less than domestic
orkers. As discussed in Section 1, these arguments correspond
o two fundamental human motives described in psychology: (1)
n-group favouritism, a preference for in-groups at the expense of
ut-groups in various contexts, including allocation of resources
nd defending the interests of group members and (2) altruistic
ustice concerns, which may  lead to behaviour aimed at foster-
ng justice even at the cost of overlooking self-interest. These two
otives have been shown to operate in parallel in intergroup deci-
ion contexts (Diekmann et al., 1997).
There are also other attitude dimensions to consider. An obvious
dvantage with imports of both goods and services from foreign
ow-wage providers is lower prices for the in-group of domes-
ic consumers. To the extent that domestic citizens are driven by
ltruistic justice concerns they should value the jobs for workers in
ow-wage economies created by trade.
.1. Survey questions – attitude dimensionsRespondents in the two surveys were asked about the attitude
imensions discussed above. In the ﬁrst survey, we also examined
hether fears of domestic job losses were mainly associated with
hort-run adjustment problems.
able 3a
ttitude dimensions for the three types of trade in Survey 1.
Goods trade 
(a) Unfair competition 2.89a,1
(b) Unfair wages 3.15b,1
(c) Low prices 3.35c,1
(d) Not fast changes 2.57d,1
(e) Foreign jobs 3.46e,1
Average 3.081
Average excluding fast changes 3.211
able 3b
ttitude dimensions for the three types of trade in Survey 2.
Goods trade Ser
(a) Unfair competition 2.88d,1 2.46
(b) Unfair wages 3.18c,1 2.70
(c) Low prices 3.04b,1 2.49
(e) Foreign jobs 3.31c,1 2.54
Average 3.101 2.55
ote: Means are calculated across individuals in the samples, excluding ‘don’t know’ and m
ave  been calculated after reverse-scoring the responses to make all responses compa
igniﬁcantly different (p > 0.05). Means in the same row that share a common subscript nu
ifference in score between the type of trade in the column and goods trade.io-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93 85
The respondents were asked to what extent they agree or dis-
agree with a number of statements which were repeated for the
three types of low-wage competition. Giving trade in services as an
example, the questions in the ﬁrst survey were:
Sweden can import services, for example in the construction sector,
from the new EU countries, by purchasing services from ﬁrms with
temporary activities in Sweden using their own posted staff. If the
foreign ﬁrms pay lower wages than Swedish ﬁrms. . .
a. . . .it  is unfair competition for Swedish workers, threatening wages
and jobs here.
b. . . .it  is unfair to the staff employed in the ﬁrms from the new EU
countries since they receive less pay than the staff in Swedish ﬁrms.
c. . . .it  is good since this implies low prices for Swedish consumers.
d. . . .it  must not lead to fast changes in the Swedish labour market.
e. . . .it  is good since it makes it possible for ﬁrms from the new EU
countries to export services to Sweden and thereby to create more
jobs for the citizens in those countries.
Analogous questions were asked for goods trade and offshoring.
In the second survey, questions of type (d) above were excluded,
but the other questions were the same. We refer subsequently to
the above attitude dimensions as (a) ‘unfair competition’, (b) ‘unfair
wages’, (c) ‘low prices’, (d) ‘not fast changes’ and (e) ‘foreign jobs’,
respectively. To examine the importance of attitudes to immigra-
tion, we also included the following question (which we shall refer
to as ‘depletion of Swedish culture’) in Survey 2:
Would you say that culture in Sweden is enriched or depleted by the
fact that many people come here from other countries?
The respondents indicated their responses to all the questions
on a ﬁve-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is ‘strongly disagree’, 2
is ‘disagree’, 3 is ‘neither agree or disagree’, 4 is ‘agree’ and 5 is
‘strongly agree’.
Tables 3a and 3b give the means of the responses in the two
surveys to the questions regarding the various attitude dimensions
for the three types of trade that we are examining. In the tables the
scale has been reversed (so that it is 6 minus the actual response)
for ‘unfair competition’, ‘unfair wages’, and ‘not fast changes’. Doing
this we  get an indicator where a higher rating always corresponds
to a more positive attitude to trade on the same 1-to-5 scale. The
entries in paranthesis give the mean difference between the rating
for services trade and the rating for goods trade, and the difference
Services trade Offshoring Average
2.48b,2 (−0.41) 2.60b,3 (−0.29) 2.66a
2.89d,2 (−0.26) 3.20c,1 (0.05) 3.08d
2.85d,2 (−0.50) 2.95d,2 (−0.40) 3.05d
2.54b,1 (−0.03) 2.58ab,1 (0.01) 2.57f
2.81d,2 (−0.65) 2.92d,2 (−0.54) 3.07d
2.722 (−0.36) 2.853 (−0.23)
2.762 (−0.45) 2.923 (−0.29)
vices trade Offshoring Average
d,2 (−0.42) 2.64d,3 (−0.24) 2.66b
c,2 (−0.48) 3.17f,1 (−0.01) 3.01c
d,2 (−0.55) 2.72cd,3 (−0.26) 2.75d
d,2 (−0.77) 2.86ce,3 (−0.45) 2.91c
2 (−0.55) 2.853 (−0.25)
issing values. Means for ‘unfair competition’, ‘unfair wages’ and ‘not fast changes’
rable. Means in the same column that share a common subscript letter are not
mber are not signiﬁcantly different (p > 0.05). Figures in paranthesis show the mean
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4, 7 and 8). More unexpectedly, the results also provide some evi-
dence that the dimension ‘low prices’ has a more positive effect on6 L. Calmfors et al. / The Journal
etween the rating for offshoring and the rating for goods trade,
espectively.
The attitude dimensions in Tables 3a and 3b give the same pic-
ure as the general attitudes in Table 2: the average ratings over the
arious dimensions (at the bottom of the table) are signiﬁcantly
ower for services trade than goods trade. The averages are also
ower for offshoring than for goods trade, but not as low as for ser-
ices trade. Comparing the averages (excluding ‘not fast changes’)
n Table 3a with the averages in Table 3b, there are again less pos-
tive trade attitudes in the later survey, which squares with the
esults in Table 2.
Attitudes are less favourable to trade in services than to trade
n goods along all dimensions except ‘not fast changes’ in the ﬁrst
urvey. In both surveys, the differences are the largest for ‘foreign
obs’ and ‘low prices’. Differences are smaller, though still signif-
cant, along the two dimensions stressed the most in the public
ebate: ‘unfair competition’ and ‘unfair wages’.
The last column in the two tables shows how positive attitudes
re to trade in general along the different dimensions. It is no sur-
rise that trade attitudes are more positive along the dimensions
low prices’ and ‘foreign jobs’ (since these are beneﬁts of trade)
han along the dimension ‘unfair competition’ (which is a negative
ffect). It is more unexpected that the highest pro-trade score is
btained for the dimension ‘unfair wages’: it reﬂects that respon-
ents do not agree with the statement that it is unfair with lower
ages for foreign than domestic employees. There is no general
endency to agree more strongly with statements pointing to in-
roup effects on nationals than with statements about the effects
n foreigners, as there is signiﬁcantly more agreement in Survey 2
ith the statement that low-wage competition is good because it
reates foreign jobs than with the statement that it is good because
t implies low domestic prices.
Comparing the responses in the two surveys, the attitude
imensions ‘low prices’ and ‘foreign jobs’ are less favourable to
rade in Survey 2 than in Survey 1. It is hard to relate this in a
nique way to the effects of the economic crisis: it is reasonable
hat the crisis could weaken concerns about ‘foreign jobs’, but on
he other hand it could be expected to make respondents evalu-
te ‘low prices’ more. Another observation is that the differences
n attitude dimensions between services trade and goods trade are
igniﬁcantly larger in the second survey for the altruistic dimen-
ions ‘unfair wages’ and ‘foreign jobs’. We  have no explanation of
his.
.2. The relationship between general attitudes and attitude
imensions
Next we examine how the attitude dimensions in Section 3.1
re correlated with the general attitudes to the different types of
rade in Section 2.2. To study this, we regressed the general atti-
ude on the attitude dimensions. In each survey we pooled all
ur observations across the types of trade. To test whether there
re systematic differences in the general attitudes to the different
orms of trade that are unrelated to differences in attitude dimen-
ions, we included dummy  variables for the type of trade among
he explanatory variables: the variable Ds for trade in services
nd the variable Do for offshoring. Signiﬁcance for these variables
eans that the general attitudes to these forms of trade differ
rom the general attitude to trade in goods even if the included
ttitude dimensions have the same scores. This could indicate the
mportance of some omitted dimension. We  also allowed for the
ossibility that the attitude dimensions could have differential
ffects on the general attitude for the different types of trade by
ncluding interaction terms between the type of trade and the atti-
ude dimensions.io-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93
We  ran both ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered logit
regressions.3 The results were very similar. Table 4 shows the OLS
regressions. Columns 1–4 apply to Survey 1 and columns 5–8 to
Survey 2. Column 1 includes the two dummy  variables and all the
attitude dimensions asked about in Survey 1. Column 2 is the same
equation but without the attitude dimension ‘not fast changes’ (to
facilitate comparison with Survey 2). Columns 3 and 4 are estima-
tions for Survey 1 that include also interaction variables; stepwise
backward regressions, keeping only variables that are signiﬁcant at
the ﬁve per cent level, have been used.
Column 5 is a regression for Survey 2 including only the two
dummy variables and the attitude dimensions asked about in this
survey (since the dimension ‘not fast changes’ is excluded, the
column 5 regression is directly comparable to the column 2 regres-
sion). Column 6 is a similar regression but with the ‘depletion of
Swedish culture’ variable added. Columns 7 and 8 are the corre-
sponding estimations including also interaction variables with only
signiﬁcant variables kept (after stepwise backward regressions).
The column 7 regression based on Survey 2 is directly comparable
to the column 4 regression based on Survey 1.
The most striking result is the strong relationship between the
general attitude and the four attitude dimensions ‘unfair com-
petition’, ‘unfair wages’, ‘low prices’ and ‘foreign jobs’ in all the
regressions. In Survey 1, ‘not fast changes’ is signiﬁcant in equa-
tion (3) but not in equation (1). Regression coefﬁcients are much
larger for ‘foreign jobs’ and ‘low prices’ than for ‘unfair competition’
and ‘unfair wages’. If we make a causal interpretation, the implica-
tion is that differences in the valuation of the foreign jobs created
and of low domestic consumer prices have the largest impact on
interpersonal differences in the general attitude to trade, although
differences in the valuation of ‘unfair competition’ and ‘unfair
jobs’ also matter. The results suggest that both considerations
regarding the in-group of domestic citizens and altruistic justice
concerns with respect to foreign workers are important for trade
attitudes.
Comparing regressions (2) and (4) for Survey 1 with the corre-
sponding regressions (5) and (7) for Survey 2, it is clear that the
regression coefﬁcients for the various attitude dimensions are of a
similar magnitude in the two  surveys, although in most cases the
coefﬁcients are somewhat lower in the Survey 2 estimations.
The intercept dummies for trade in services and offshoring
are sometimes signiﬁcantly negative and sometimes insigniﬁcant.
Hence, there is some evidence in favour of an extra negative valu-
ation of services trade and offshoring relative to goods trade over
and above that explained by differences in the attitude dimensions
(see Tables 3a and 3b), but it is rather weak.
When interaction terms between the type of trade and the atti-
tude dimensions are added (columns 3–4 and 7–8), they are in most
cases insigniﬁcant. This implies that the attitude dimensions are
usually related to the general attitude in the same way for the dif-
ferent types of trade. There are only a few exceptions. Focusing on
the interactions with services trade, the results provide some, but
not overwhelming, support for the hypotheses that the dimensions
‘unfair competition’ and ‘unfair wages’ inﬂuence the general atti-
tude to services trade more negatively than the general attitude to
other types of trade, which is what we expected à priori (equations3 We also created a binary variable to measure the general attitude to trade which
we  used in logit regressions. The results were not qualitatively different from those
based on ordered logits. Since the observations are pooled across types of trade and
each individual recurs three times in the data, the residuals can be correlated. To
handle this, we used clustered robust standard errors in the analysis.
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Table 4
The relationship between the general attitude and attitude dimensions.
Survey 1 Survey 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ds −0.072 −0.075 −0.120 −0.133
(0.120) (0.099)* (0.007)** (0.003)***
Do −0.086 −0.099 −0.107 −0.028 −0.037 −0.237
(0.087)* (0.046)** (0.026)** (0.515) (0.391) (0.010)**
Unfair 0.186 0.196 0.163 0.196 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.139
competition (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ds  × Unfair −0.059
competition (0.000)***
Do  × Unfair 0.072
competition (0.035)**
Unfair 0.112 0.113 0.114 0.123 0.094 0.098 0.127 0.078
wages (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ds  × Unfair −0.031 −0.094
wages  (0.018)** (0.000)***
Do  × Unfair 0.063
wages (0.026)**
Not  fast 0.023 0.054
changes (0.255) (0.024)**
Do  × Not −0.089
fast changes (0.012)**
Low  prices 0.282 0.282 0.285 0.282 0.281 0.285 0.261
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Ds  × Low 0.062 0.285
prices (0.021)** (0.000)***
Foreign jobs 0.328 0.316 0.333 0.314 0.274 0.256 0.272 0.255
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Depletion of −0.080 −0.080
Swedish culture (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Constant −0.133  −0.056 −0.216 −0.077 0.263 0.471 0.204 0.485
(0.129) (0.496) (0.004)*** (0.292) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)***
Number of observations 2565 2703 2565 2703 2860 2836 2860 2836
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ote: * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%; p-values in paren
he general attitude to trade in services than on the general attitude
o the other types of trade (equations 7 and 8).
When the ‘depletion of Swedish culture’ variable was added
o the regressions (equations 6 and 8), it entered as signiﬁcantly
egative. Interactions between this variable and the types of trade
ere, however, insigniﬁcant. It thus appears that anti-immigration
ttitudes are associated with a generally more negative attitude
o all types of trade, but there is no support for the hypothesis that
nti-immigration attitudes could explain why general attitudes are
ore negative to services trade involving posted workers than to
he other types of trade.
We  also examine which contributions the various attitude
imensions make to the differences in the general attitude
etween, on one hand, goods trade and, on the other hand, ser-
ices trade and offshoring described in Table 2. To do this, we
rst regressed the pooled general attitudes on the dummy  vari-
bles Ds and Do only, so that these dummy  variables are made
o account for all of the mean differences in the general attitudes
etween the different forms of trade (Tables 5a and 5b). Then we
dded sequentially the various attitude dimensions to the regres-
ions and examined how the regression coefﬁcients for the dummy
ariables change. These changes measure the contributions to the
ean differences between the general attitudes to the various types
f trade from the differences in the various attitude dimensions.
he contributions reﬂect differences in both the various attitude
imensions between the different forms of trade and in the impacts
regression coefﬁcients) on the general attitude. When all attitude
imensions have been added, the regression equations obtained
re equations 2 and 5 in Table 4. As can be seen, ‘unfair competi-
ion’, ‘low prices’ and ‘foreign jobs’ all make large contributions to
he mean general attitude difference between services trade and
oods trade, whereas there is no contribution from ‘unfair wages’..379 0.342 0.350 0.345 0.352
s.
4. Experiments
For economists a natural assumption is that an individual’s gen-
eral attitude to a particular type of trade is determined by various
attitude dimensions in much the same way as an individual’s utility
in economic theory is given by a well-deﬁned utility function with
a number of arguments. Such ‘rational’ formulation of general atti-
tudes has also been analysed in psychology (see Eagly and Chaiken,
1993 for a review). However, an individual who  has formed an over-
all view on an issue may  also try to justify this view by adjusting
various speciﬁc considerations to ﬁt in with this overall evalua-
tion. This raises the possibility of reverse causality in the regressions
in Section 3.2: the attitude dimensions may  not be exogenous to
the general attitude but may  instead be inﬂuenced by it because
individuals want to rationalise their attitudes.
Research in psychology has shown that people adjust their atti-
tudes and behaviour in search for consistency in order to reduce
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Abelson, 1959; Rosenberg,
1960). Holyoak and Simon (1999) and Simon et al. (2008) have
conducted experiments to examine how people change or main-
tain their arguments in favour of or against certain alternatives
before and after they have reached a decision. They ﬁnd that peo-
ple seek maximum consistency among the underlying inferences
when making decisions based on complex, but ambiguous, infor-
mation. This tendency has been labelled coherence-seeking.  It has
been shown to occur in a variety of decision-making and attitude
change contexts (Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Shultz et al.,
1999; Russo et al., 2008).To study the importance of coherence-seeking for the attitudes
to low-wage trade competition in the service sector, we  devised an
experiment. In a ﬁrst stage (pre-test), the participants were asked
about their views concerning different dimensions of the issue
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Table 5a
Unexplained difference to general attitude to goods trade in Survey 1.
Model Services  Offshoring 
(1) −0.542 −0.431
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(2) Unfair competition + (1) −0.396 +0.146 −0.332 +0.099
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(3) Unfair wages + (2) −0.379 −0.003 −0.351 −0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(4) Low prices + (3) −0.202 +0.199 −0.203 +0.148
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(5) Foreign jobs + (4) −0.075 +0.127 −0.099 +0.104
(0.099)* (0.046)**
Table 5b
Unexplained difference to general attitude to goods trade in Survey 2.
Model Services  Offshoring 
(1) −0.604 −0.275
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(2) Unfair competition + (1) −0.492 +0.112 −0.215 +0.060
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(3) Unfair wages + (2) −0.444 −0.048 −0.229 −0.015
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(4) Low prices + (3) −0.253 +0.191 −0.099 +0.130
(0.000)*** (0.023)**
(5) Foreign jobs + (4) −0.120 +0.133 −0.028 +0.071
(0.007)*** (0.515)
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2ote: Estimated speciﬁcation General attitude = const + ı1 × Ds + ı2 × Do + ıj × attitu
ffshoring, respectively. Robust p-values in parantheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%: ** sign
f  the regression.
ithout being informed that they were later to be asked to take an
verall stand. To conceal the overall issue at this stage, the questions
n low-wage trade competition were mixed with questions about
ther labour market issues. In a second stage, the participants were
sked to indicate their general attitude to low-wage trade competi-
ion for services. In the third and ﬁnal stage, the respondents were
gain asked to state their views regarding various dimensions of
he issue (post-test).
The purpose of the experiment was to examine to what extent
he respondents adjusted their attitude dimensions after they
xpressed their general attitude. This can be seen as a study of
ow rational individuals are when forming their general attitudes.
e also wanted to examine which attitudes are the most stable
nd the least prone to be adjusted once the general attitude has
een formed. The aim was to further highlight what fundamen-
al considerations determine the overall views on low-wage trade
ompetition for services.
.1. The design of the experiment
For the two  questionnaires we chose six speciﬁc attitude
imensions. Each one was measured by two arguments from
pposite perspectives: one in favour of free low-wage compe-
ition (denoted ‘free competition’), the other opposed to such
ompetition (denoted ‘wage regulation’). In the questionnaire, the
rguments for each side were parallel in form so as to encourage
articipants to align and compare the conﬂicting arguments for
ach attitude dimension. The dimensions and arguments were:
. Competition
- Wage regulation: low-wage competition is unfair;
- Free competition: low-wage competition is fair.
. Long-term consequences for exporting country
- Wage regulation: exporting country will remain in a trap with
low-wage production;ensionj where j = 3. . .7, and Ds and Do are dummy  variables for services trade and
 at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All variables add signiﬁcantly to the explanatory power
- Free competition: low-wage exports will create job opportunities
and stimulate economic growth.
3. Long-term consequences for importing country
- Wage regulation: low-wage competition will cause business clos-
ings as well as long-term stagnation and unemployment;
- Free competition: some ﬁrms will disappear but other more efﬁ-
cient ones will replace them.
4. Low import prices
- Wage regulation: cheap low-wage imports are bad because
they build on the exploitation of foreign employees;
- Free competition: low-wage imports are good because they
imply low prices.
5. Low-wage work abroad
- Wage regulation: low-wage work abroad represents exploitation
of workers;
- Free competition: low-wage work abroad provides the individual
with an opportunity to develop and learn from other countries.
6. Historical development
- Wage regulation: stable employer–employee relations are the
prime cause of growth;
-  Free competition: international competition and free trade are the
prime causes of growth.
Although grouped somewhat differently, the attitude dimen-
sions in the experiment ‘nest’ the ones in the two surveys and thus
include both in-group considerations and altruistic justice con-
cerns. In addition, we have added explicit considerations about
future growth consequences in both the import and the export
country as well as considerations about what has explained domes-
tic growth in the past.
Although constructed to measure the same dimensions, the
questions were not formulated identically in the pre-test and the
post-test. In the pre-test we  used a local perspective (also helping
to disguise the purpose of the experiment), whereas the questions
were formulated in terms of general principles in the post-test.
 of Socio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93 89
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Table 6
Mean scores in the free competition and wage regulation groups by sub-sample.
Pre-test Post-test Average Per cent in favour
Psychology students
Wage regulation 0.23 −1.13 −0.45 64
Free competition 1.19 1.98 1.59 36
Economics students
Wage regulation 0.99 −0.35 0.32 40.5
Free competition 2.54 2.87 2.70 59.5
Passport ofﬁce
Wage regulation 0.30 −0.67 −0.19 57
Free competition 2.33 2.67 2.50 43
Average
Wage regulation 0.39 −0.84 −0.22 56
Free competition 1.96 2.44 2.20 44
Note: The scores in the table show the averaged scores over all attitude dimensions
for the various groups. A higher rating indicates a more positive attitude to low-wage
competition in services trade. The last column shows the percentage of respondents
in  the sub-sample favouring each position.
Fig. 1. Change in mean score for all attitude dimensions between pre-test and post-
test.
Note:  A higher score indicates a more positive attitude to low-wage trade com-
petition in service provision. A 2 × 2 mixed model ANOVA with phase (pre-test
sions except ‘long-term consequences for the importing country’
differed signiﬁcantly between the two groups already in the pre-
test.5 The differences were the largest for ‘competition’, ‘low
4 t(138) = 3.8, p = 0.001.L. Calmfors et al. / The Journal
All attitude dimensions were measured on an 11-point scale
from −5 to 5, 0 indicating neutrality), with the endpoints labelled
Do not agree at all’ and ‘Agree fully’.
.1.1. The set-up of the experiment
First, the participants answered the questions in the pre-test.
fter completion of it, the participants were distracted by having
o work on a cognitively demanding ﬁller task in order to reduce
emory effects. In the next step, the respondents were asked to
ake a general stand regarding low-wage competition from foreign
ervice providers with posted workers. The participants were pre-
ented with two constructed ‘debate articles’: one arguing in favour
f such low-wage competition and one arguing against. This design
nsured that, before stating their general attitudes, all participants
ere provided with balanced information representing the opin-
ons of both sides. Participants were instructed to assess which
rticle best corresponded to their attitudes. After the respondents
ad taken a general stand, they were presented with the post-test
uestionnaire.
.1.2. Participants
The 140 participants in the experiment consisted of three dif-
erent groups:
. 42 passport applicants waiting at the Passport Ofﬁce in Stock-
holm.
. 37 undergraduate students at the Department of Economics,
Stockholm University.
. 61 undergraduate students at the Department of Psychology,
Stockholm University.
.2. Results
We  distinguished between two attitude groups based on the
articipants’ general attitudes (captured by which debate article
as preferred). The group preferring the article in favour of low-
age trade competition is henceforth labelled the ‘free competition
roup’. The group preferring the article arguing against such trade
s labelled the ‘wage regulation group’.
For each attitude dimension and respondent, we  computed
n index of how positive the respondent was to low-wage trade
ompetition. The ratings for the questions asked from the wage
egulation perspective were reversed and the score for each atti-
ude dimension was calculated as the mean of the ratings for the
wo arguments that measured it.
.2.1. Distribution of attitudes
84 participants (56 per cent) preferred the wage regulation
ebate article, whereas 56 participants (44 per cent) favoured the
ree competition article. The close to 50 per cent split between the
rticles implies that they were approximately similar in terms of
ersuasiveness. The economics students were – not very surpris-
ngly as this is in line with what they are taught – most positive to
ow-wage trade competition and the students at the Department
f Psychology the least positive. This is illustrated in Table 6, which
lso shows the average scores over all the attitudes for the three
ubgroups in both the pre-test and the post-test.
.2.2. Change in averaged attitude from pre-test to post-test
Fig. 1 presents the mean scores over all the attitude dimensions
n the pre-test and the post-test, respectively, plotted separately for
he free competition and the wage regulation groups. The free com-
etition group was clearly positive to low-wage trade competition
n the pre-test (mean score = 1.96). The wage regulation group, too,
as positive in the pre-test, but only weakly so (mean score = 0.39).and post-test) as a within-subject factor and attitude group (free competition and
wage regulation) as a between-subject factor yielded a signiﬁcant interaction effect:
F(1,138) = 77.9, p < 0.001, ŋ2 = 0.36.
In line with our hypothesis of coherence-seeking, there was  pola-
risation between the two groups between the tests: the average
difference in attitude dimensions between the two groups widened
after the respondents had expressed their general attitudes. In the
post-test, the free competition group was even more positive (mean
score = 2.44), whereas the wage regulation group became nega-
tive (mean score = −0.84). Thus, both groups adjusted their attitude
dimensions to ﬁt in with their general evaluation. However, a t-test
showed that the change between pre-test and post-test ratings was
signiﬁcantly larger in the wage regulation group than in the free
competition group.4 This suggests that there are ‘non-rational’ ele-
ments in the formation of attitudes to low-wage trade competition
in services with posted workers both among those in favour and
among those against, but that the degree of rationality is smaller in
the latter group.
4.2.3. Change in the various attitude dimensions
Fig. 2 show how each attitude dimension changed. All dimen-5 Competition F(1,137) = 10.7, p < 0.001, ŋ2[0] = 0.07; exporting country
F(1,138) = 26.6, p < 0.001, ŋ2[0] = 0.17; importing country F(1,138) = 46.0, p < 0.001,
ŋ2[0]  = 0.25; low prices F(1,138) = 13.9, p < 0.001, ŋ2[0] = 0.09; low wage abroad
F(1,137) = 62.5, p = 0.001, ŋ2[0] = 0.10; historical development ns. Test statistics
from one-way ANOVA.
90 L. Calmfors et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93
ttitude dimensions between pre-test and post-test.
i
d
s
s
t
c
f
f
g
w
i
d
t
q
f
g
d
t
s
e
i
d
t
a
ﬁ
a
b
o
e
r
w
e
Table 7
The relationship between attitude group membership and attitude dimensions.
Variable Coefﬁcient
Wage regulation: competition −0.214
(0.007)**
Wage regulation: import prices −0.180
(0.009)**
Free competition: low-wage work abroad 0.193
(0.053)**
Free competition: historical development 0.271
(0.038)**
Wage regulation: historical development −0.182
(0.042)**
Constant −1.632
Note: * signiﬁcant at 5%, ** signiﬁcant at 1%; p-values in parentheses. A stepwise
backward-elimination logit model was  used with attitude group membership as the
dependent variable and responses to the twelve pre-test questions as explanatory
variables. The regression model classiﬁed 77.5 percent of the participants correctly
(compared to 55.8 percent with no regression model). A pro-free-competition gen-
eral attitude was coded as one and a pro-wage-regulation general attitude as zero
in  the outcome variable. In the regression, the unreversed scores for the questions
from the wage regulation perspective were used. Hence, negative coefﬁcients for
the wage regulation variables imply that a higher degree of agreement with these
items reduces the odds that a respondent has a general pro-free-trade attitude.Fig. 2. Change in mean score for the various a
mport prices’ and ‘historical development’. This suggests that these
imensions could be more fundamental than the other ones, pos-
ibly ‘determining’ the general attitude.
All attitude dimensions except ‘historical development’ changed
igniﬁcantly between the pre-test and the post-test. In all the cases
he difference between the two groups increased signiﬁcantly. The
hanges were always larger for the wage regulation group than
or the free competition group except for ‘long-run consequences
or the importing country’. The most stable dimension for both
roups was ‘historical development’. The least stable dimensions
ere those that concerned long-run, future consequences for the
mporting or the exporting country.
To further illustrate which attitudes were ‘most basic’ for
etermining the general attitude, we also distinguished between
he perspectives (free competition or wage regulation) in the
uestions (see Section 4.1). This gave us twelve attitude scores
or each participant. We  then ran a logistic regression with the
eneral attitude as the dependent variable (the stand on the
ebate article was treated as a binary variable; 1 = free compe-
ition attitude and 0 = wage regulation attitude) and the pre-test
cores for the attitude dimensions distinguished by perspective as
xplanatory variables (Table 7). The variables that turned out signif-
cant were: ‘competition’ (wage regulation perspective), ‘historical
evelopment’ (both the free competition and the wage regula-
ion perspective), ‘low import prices’ (wage regulation perspective)
nd ‘low-wage work abroad’ (free competition perspective). The
rst three variables (the wage regulation ‘competition’ argument
nd the two ‘historical development’ arguments) concern the well-
eing of the in-group of Swedes. The last two arguments, on the
ther hand, reﬂect altruistic considerations with regard to for-
ign workers (the ‘low import prices’ argument from the wage
egulation perspective concerned the attitude that ‘cheap low-
age imports are bad because they build on exploitation of foreign
mployees’).6
6 See Section 4.1.4.2.4. Correlation analysis
Another way of testing the hypothesis of coherence-seeking
is to study whether the covariation among the attitude dimen-
sions increases after the general attitude is expressed. Point-biserial
correlations between the general attitude and all the speciﬁc
attitudes in the pre-test and in the post-test were computed
in Table 8. All correlations were positive, but the correla-
tion coefﬁcients were generally much higher in the post-test
than in the pre-test. In the pre-test, 13 out of 21 correla-
tions were signiﬁcant and the mean correlation was  0.24. In
the post-test, all correlations were signiﬁcant and the mean cor-
relation was  as high as 0.64. This provides strong evidence of
coherence-seeking.
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Table 8
Correlations.
Pre-test 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Competition 0.51 ∗ ∗∗ 0.437*** −0.045*** 0.227*** 0.362*** 0.495**
2  Low import prices 0.530** 0.102 0.149 0.229** 0.428**
3  Consequences exporting country 0.023 0.203* 0.327** 0.278**
4  Consequences importing country 0.108 −0.043 0.043
5  Low wage work abroad 0.076 0.274**
6  Historical development 0.384**
7  General attitude
Post-test 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Competition 0.824 ∗ ∗ 0.652** 0.706** 0.694** 0.529** 0.736**
2  Low import prices 0.652** 0.719** 0.693** 0.544** 0.737**
3 Consequences exporting country 0.567** 0.619** 0.559** 0.628**
4  Consequences importing country 0.696** 0.619** 0.616**
5  Low wage work abroad 0.524** 0.619**
6  Historical development 0.500**
7  General attitude
Note: Pre-test: mean correlation = 0.24. Chronbach’s alpha = 0.63; Post-test: mean correla
Fig. 3. Average means for free-trade and wage-regulation groups in the ﬁve exper-
iments.
Note:  In Experiment 2 the diagram shows only the scores for those for whom the
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trade competition. Somewhat surprisingly, differences between
services imports involving posted workers and goods imports con-rder of questions was  reversed.
.3. Robustness tests
In our experiment, attitude dimensions clearly became more
oherent after a participant had read the debate articles and
xpressed an opinion. Attitude dimensions also became more
olarised between those in favour of free trade and those in favour
f regulation. It could, however, be the case that the results are
ffected by differences in the formulations of pre-test and post-
est questions or by the fact that there is repeated measurement
f the attitude dimensions. Nor is it clear from the experiment
hether coherence-seeking is the consequence of expressing an
pinion or of reading the debate articles or whether both factors
re needed. To highlight these issues we made four supplemen-
ary experiments, all involving students at Stockholm University’s
epartment of Psychology.
Experiment 2 examined whether the different perspectives in
he pre-test and the post-test could have inﬂuenced the results. For
alf the experiment group the order of the pre-test and the post-
est was reversed. Experiment 3 examined whether the polarisation
etween the free-trade and the wage-regulation group was a by-
roduct of repeated measurement. The experiment included the
re-test and the post-test, but participants read no debate articles
nd were not asked about their general attitude. In experiment 4,
articipants expressed their general attitudes, but they were nottion = 0.64. Chronbach’s alpha = 0.91. * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
presented with the debate articles, whereas in experiment 5 they
read the debate articles but did not express their general attitudes.
Fig. 3 shows the average means for the free-trade and wage-
regulation groups in the pre-test and the post-test in the ﬁve
experiments. Again more extreme values in the post-test than in
the pre-test indicate polarisation between the two tests. There
was polarisation independently of the order in which questions
were asked (Experiments 1 and 2). There was no polarisation
from only answering the questions twice (Experiment 3). For the
wage-regulation group only expressing the general attitude or only
reading the debate articles were enough to give attitude polarisa-
tion, whereas this was  not the case for the free-trade group. This can
be interpreted as another indication of less stable attitude dimen-
sions for the wage-regulation than the free-trade group.
5. Conclusions
The extent to which low-wage trade competition in the service
sector with posted workers should be allowed in the EU is a highly
controversial issue. The heated political debate suggests that peo-
ple’s attitudes are less positive to this type of trade in services than
to traditional trade in goods. Possible explanations are a higher
degree of visibility of the competitors in this case, that such trade
is new and therefore implies losses for groups threatened by the
competition (which count for more than the gains for consumers)
or that the posting of foreign workers may  trigger anti-immigration
sentiments.
We have performed two  survey studies on random samples
of Swedish citizens (in 2007 and 2010) of the attitudes to three
forms of trade: imports of goods, imports of services requiring the
presence of posted workers, and offshoring of domestic ﬁnal pro-
duction. The results conﬁrm that people’s general attitudes are
more negative to such trade in services than to trade in goods.
Attitudes are also more negative to trade in services involving
posted workers than to offshoring despite the fact that the latter
activity implies less beneﬁt to domestic consumers in the form of
lower import prices. This offers some support for the hypotheses
that visibility effects, loss-aversion concerns and anti-immigration
sentiments could be important for the attitudes to low-wage com-
petition involving posted workers.
In the survey studies, we  also examined differences in various
attitude dimensions between the three different forms of low-wagecerning the evaluation of negative consequences in the form of
‘unfair competition’ for domestic workers and ‘unfair wages’ for
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oreign workers, the arguments which have dominated the debate,
ere not the largest. The largest differences in attitude dimensions
nstead concerned respondents’ judgements of the positive conse-
uences of low prices for domestic consumers and the creation of
obs for foreigners, which were much more positive for goods trade
han for services trade involving posted workers. The results indi-
ate that both in-group favouritism, i.e. a concern with the effects
n social groups to which an individual belongs (in this case the
omestic population), and altruistic justice concerns (in this case for
oreign workers) matter for trade attitudes. The dimensions ‘low
rices for domestic consumers’ and ‘unfair competition’ belong to
he ﬁrst category of motives, ‘unfair wages’ and ‘creation of foreign
obs’ to the second.
We regressed the general attitude to the different forms of
rade on the various attitude dimensions. The strongest relation-
hips were found between the general attitude and the dimensions
low prices’ and ‘foreign jobs’, whereas the dimensions ‘unfair
ompetition’ and in particular ‘unfair wages’ mattered less. Anti-
mmigration sentiments were found to inﬂuence the general
ttitude to all types of trade negatively. In contrast to what we had
ypothesised, we did not ﬁnd a stronger effect of anti-immigration
entiments on trade in services involving posted workers than on
he other types of trade.
A problem that must be taken seriously concerns the direction
f causality between the general attitude and attitude dimensions.
t may  not be that an individual simply forms an overall view (the
eneral attitude) from a number of speciﬁc considerations (attitude
imensions), but an individual might also rationalise her overall
iew by adjusting her evaluations of different dimensions to it. Such
oherence-seeking has been suggested by research in psychology on
ther issues.
To study this, we designed experiments with small groups in
hich participants ﬁrst had to state their views (attitude dimen-
ions) regarding various aspects of low-wage trade competition
n a local context in which they were not aware of the general
ssue (pre-test). The aspects concerned both pure value judge-
ents (whether or not trade competition is fair, whether or not
ow-wage work abroad is fair and whether or not low wages
or foreign workers resulting in low import prices are fair) and
udgements of economic effects (historical reasons for growth as
ell as future, long-run consequences for growth and jobs in the
mporting and the exporting country). In a second stage, partici-
ants were asked about their general attitude to service provision
rom foreign low-wage ﬁrms using posted workers. In a third
tage, participants were again asked about their views regarding
he various aspects (attitude dimensions) of services trade (post-
est).
We found strong evidence of coherence-seeking. The differences
n attitude dimensions between those in favour of low-wage trade
ompetition and those against increased signiﬁcantly between the
re-test and the post-test. The correlations between the attitude
imensions were also much higher in the post-test than in the pre-
est. Coherence-seeking was stronger for those opposed to low-
age trade competition than for those in favour.
The most stable attitude dimension, i.e. the dimension that
hanged the least between the pre-test and the post-test, con-
erned the role played by international trade versus good
nion-employer relationships for economic growth in the past
‘historical development’). This is logical, since the issue of ‘his-
orical development’ was probably the most tangible of the issues
articipants were asked to evaluate. The least stable dimensions
ere those that concerned judgements of future long-run effectsor the importing or the exporting country. When running a regres-
ion to explain the general attitude to service provision by foreign
ow-wage ﬁrms with the speciﬁc attitude dimensions in the pre-
est, the attitudes to ‘historical development’, but also attitudesio-Economics 47 (2013) 82– 93
regarding ‘unfair competition’, ‘unfair wages’ and ‘consequences
for foreign jobs’ turned out to be signiﬁcant.
To sum up, both in-group favouritism (concerns about the
well-being of the domestic population) and altruistic justice con-
siderations (concerns about foreign workers) appear to explain
attitudes to low-wage trade in general, as well as why attitudes
to such trade are more negative for services requiring the posting
of workers than for goods. Attitude formation seems to have both
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ components. This holds for both those in
favour of low-wage competition in services trade and for those
against. A possible interpretation is that the degree of ‘rational-
ity’ is larger for the former group, as this group was  less prone
to adjust its attitude dimensions to the general attitude than the
other group. This raises the possibility that more discussion and
analysis of the effects of services trade involving posted workers
could lead to more positive attitudes to it. This conclusion, how-
ever, merits further research, as it could also be the case that those
in favour of low-wage competition in services trade with posted
workers regard themselves as ‘challengers’ of the ‘existing order’.
According to other psychological research, this could make them
more reluctant to absorb new information and adjust their views
accordingly than those who see themselves as ‘defenders’ of the
current situation (Calmfors et al., 2011).
The fundamental differences in attitudes between imports of
services involving posted workers with low wages and imports
of goods produced by labour abroad with low wages are likely
to have important implications for how far European economic
integration can proceed. Market integration will probably never
be as far-reaching for services as for goods. Adverse attitudes to
low-wage competition from foreign service providers with worker
presence ‘on-the-spot’ are likely to act as a serious constraint on
how much of such competition that will be accepted.
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